Rating Efforts to Extend Access on Essential Medicines:
Increasing Global Health Impact i
I. Introduction
Global inequality impacts global health. The rich can, but the poor cannot, access many of the existing medicines they need. About a third of all deaths, 18 million a year or 50,000 every day, are poverty-related.
ii There is also a large mismatch between pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) spending and the global burden of disease (GBD).
iii Pharmaceutical companies have very little incentive to do new R&D on drugs for the poor (who lack the money to buy them). What should we do to address the consequences of inequality for global health?
One option is to try to restructure the incentives pharmaceutical companies face so that they can extend access on essential medicines to the poor. Several philosophers have argued that this is morally required.
iv To date, however, very few philosophers have advanced concrete proposals for doing so.
v Though, many have criticized Thomas Pogge's proposal for a Health Impact Fund that would provide prizes for companies producing new drugs in proportion to their impact on global health.
vi That more philosophical work has not been done on potential ways of restructuring the incentives pharmaceutical companies face so that they can extend access on essential medicines to the poor is unfortunate. There is a great need for serious philosophical reflection on this topic. To begin to fill this lacuna, this paper considers the case for a new alternative: Rating companies' efforts to extend access on essential medicines. Very roughly, a rating system would evaluate companies on the basis of the disease burden their innovations might alleviate, their effectiveness, and how many people have access to them.
As I argue at length elsewhere, a good rating system will incentivize companies to promote global health.
vii Highly rated companies might, for instance, be given a Global Health Impact (GHI) label to use on all of their --especially over the counter --products. This label might be similar to "Fair Trade," "(Product) RED," "USDA Organic," "Smart Wood Certified Forestry," or "Ethos" labels. Highly rated companies might use the GHI label to garner a larger share of the market, as people often prefer to purchase goods from "ethically" labeled companies.
viii If Weyth, for example, was highly rated, it could use the label on all of its products, including Advil. If even a small percentage of consumers would prefer products from highly rated companies, the incentive to use the GHI label for analgesics alone could be significant in this approximately two-billion dollar a year market.
ix Furthermore, pharmaceutical companies make many products besides drugsfrom diet drinks and lotion, to pet vitamins and mouth wash. So, they could use the GHI label on these products too.
Even if a labeling campaign is not a good idea, a GHI certification system should be of intrinsic interest and would also open the door to other kinds of fruitful social activism. Companies and researchers might use it to gauge R&D efforts. Socially responsible investment companies could include in their portfolio GHI companies. One can also imagine boycotts of poorly rated companies, lobbying of insurance companies to include GHI products in their formularies, and so forth. Finally, because pharmaceutical companies rely, to a large extent, on university R&D, universities might make it a condition of the sale of their licenses that companies agree to abide by GHI standards. If such a GHI Licensing Campaign was only as successful as United Students Against Sweatshops has been so far in convincing campuses to change their licensing practices, this proposal will create 840 million dollars worth of incentive for pharmaceutical companies to become certified every year.
x That is about the cost of developing a new drug on the highest estimates.
xi This much money might greatly increase the rate at which new drugs are produced for neglected diseases.
xii This proposal will not solve every health problem but, if successful, it will have a significant impact. I argue elsewhere that there is some reason to believe this proposal is feasible and has some advantages over the main competitors. It can, in any case, be used in conjunction with all of the alternatives.
Panel 1: A Few Uses for a Rating System
 Information source for research  Basis for a labeling system  Basis for a licensing campaign  Basis for socially responsible investment decisions  Basis for other kinds of social activism, e.g. targeted boycotts This paper argues that it is possible to design a good rating system -one that rewards highly rated companies for doing things that actually promote global health. In doing so, it suggests that practical work on promoting global health can yield interesting philosophical questions and conclusions. It makes this case by highlighting some of the normative choices that are important to address in developing a rating system and suggesting that what normative questions arise, and what answers are appropriate, depends significantly on what one is trying to achieve.
II. Rating System Design
To rate companies on the basis of some of their products' impact it is first necessary to decide exactly which drugs, diseases, and population groups to focus on. In previous work, I suggested looking at the US Food and Drug Administration approved "orphan" drugs, xiii but I no longer believe this is the best way to proceed. Too many things that are important for global health are absent from the list. The only malaria drugs on the orphan drug list, for instance, are: Mefloquine (Larium), Quinine Sulfate, and Halofantrine. There are 23 (often combination) treatments for (primarily, p. falciparum or p. vivax) malaria that the World Health Organization (WHO) found worth examining for resistance and efficacy.
xv It is probably better to just consider some of the drugs for disease that have a large impact on the poor -neglected tropical diseases, malaria, HIV, tuberculosis, and so forth. Though, it is not immediately obvious which diseases have the largest impact on the poor -it depends, in part, on what counts as a disease (or how the diseases are grouped). In the chart below, for instance, diarrhoeal diseases (Rotavirus, Cholera, Dysentery etc.) are grouped and, so, have a much bigger impact in terms of mortality (though the same is true of DALYs) than they would each have alone. Similarly, childhood diseases look significant together but most do not make a significant contribution on their own. Fortunately, there may be room for pragmatic considerations to enter in choosing some sub-set of diseases to focus on in developing a rating system. Supposing it is possible to settle on a list of diseases by appeal to pragmatic considerations, hard questions will arise about which drugs and population groups to focus on. A reasonable first approximation might be to look at the impact of first-line drugs for those diseases in all the countries where the disease is prevalent (by comparing existing first line drugs to the next best available drug). This is a reasonable place to start even though there are different ways of defining the poorest countries, and sometimes drugs that do not address the diseases prevalent in these countries will have a large impact on global health. For there is good evidence that companies often neglect the diseases prevalent in these countries.
xvii So, there is reason for those interested in promoting global health to encourage companies to focus on addressing this oversight.
One might object to limiting the study to any subset of drugs or diseases. More generally, one might worry about creating a rating system for only some of the things companies are doing (extending access on essential medicines to the poor as opposed to improving health infrastructure or whatnot).
xviii For, a partial rating system will give companies an incentive to divert funds to meeting only some needs. They might divert funds away from yet more valuable projects. This may not, however, pose an ethical problem. It may be permissible for individual researchers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working on a label to do what they can to encourage companies to extend access on some drugs for malaria or neglected tropical diseases. This may just provide reason for others to encourage companies to extend access on other medicines or to make appropriate health-related infrastructure investments or whatnot. After all, the money that companies put into extending access on some medicines need not undermine their other attempts to help the poor. The funds need not come from their health-related infrastructure investment budgets, for instance. They could come from their non-essential drug budgets. Consider an analogy. Those who defend child labor often argue that if child labor is eliminated, children and their families will suffer. A child's next-best alternative might be prostitution. Even if this is true, however, it provides no reason to allow child labor. At least it provides no more reason to allow child labor than finding out that a child prostitute's next best alternative is slavery provides to allow child prostitution. Rather, it provides reason to try to both eliminate child labor and provide better jobs for adults and schools for children.
xix None of this means, however, that it is impermissible for one group to open a school and another to expose child labor. The GHI labeling proposal advanced here is not a complete solution to the problems the poor face in meeting their basic health needs. Still, it may help the poor meet these needs.
Moreover, once there is some rating system in place, it may be easier for researchers to gather more information. It may be possible to just start with the available information, eliciting more information as a condition of rating companies once the system is up and running. Some information is sensitive, but the proposal gives companies an incentive to release it.
Supposing we can arrive at a select list of diseases and focus drugs, some of the standard tools for effectiveness analysis may allow us to evaluate companies on that basis. The proposed methodology is, roughly, this. First, consider the burden of disease alleviated by each drug in the relevant countries, e.g. in DALYs. The burden of disease equivalent dosages will alleviate can be calculated using a proxy for access like price, the disease burden information in the WHO's burden of disease (GBD) study, and drug efficacy estimates modeled from efficacy data collected from WHO reports, clinical trials, and meta-analyses of such data (the necessary modeling is sketched in the next section). Consider an illustrative example of how this information might be used. Suppose, for simplicity's sake, that everyone has access to all of the drugs evaluated.
xx Suppose disease burden is calculated in DALYs and 34 million DALYs are lost to plasmodium falciparum malaria. Suppose Quinine is effective in about 9% of cases while Mefloquine is effective in about 5% of cases. If the next best alternative to each of these drugs averted 1 million DALYs, at the margin Quinine and Mefloquine might avert about 2.1 and .7 million DALYs, respectively. The next step is to rate companies on the basis of their inventions' (marginal potential) impact. Suppose Pfizer has two drugs that, at the margin, avert the loss of 2.1 and .7 million DALYs, respectively. Suppose Bayer has one drug that, at the margin, averts the loss of 3 million DALYs. Bayer may be ranked above Pfizer. The marginal impact of Bayer's drug is 3 million DALYs averted, while Pfizer's drugs' marginal impact is 2.8 million DALYs averted. If innovations are evaluated in this way, this rating system will give companies an incentive to produce more effective drugs that address the largest global health problems.
Michael Selgelid might object to looking at drugs' marginal impact. Some drugs have a greater impact in combination than alone. Looking at marginal impact is to suppose one particular way of splitting the credit between companies' interventions but it is not clearly the best way. To illustrate the problem, suppose that we decide to measure disease burden in DALYs. Suppose one company's drug averts 2 million DALYs on its own. Then, suppose another company creates a drug that would alleviate 1 million on its own, but together with the first company's drug, helps avert 20 million DALYs. Should the new intervention receive credit for averting 18 million DALYs and the original intervention receive credit for averting 2 million DALYs? Should the 18 million marginal gain be split between the interventions? Should the new company receive all 20 million in credit?
It may be morally acceptable to attribute credit in many ways, but it is clear how the question should be answered in this context. What matters is maximizing the incentive for companies to ameliorate the GBD. If the recommended treatment becomes a combination of two drugs, one might initially think the company producing the new drug should get all the credit for the marginal impact of their creation (18 million DALYs averted). If another company comes along and offers a better drug to be used in combination with the original drug -that, say, saves 21 million DALYs -that company would then receive one million DALYs worth of credit and the other company would receive none.
Selgelid worries that this will give companies an incentive not to put their part of a combination forward (or to withdraw it from the market) until other companies put their part of the combination forward, but I am not sure this will pose a problem for the rating system. Companies that make drugs that might be used in combination have reason to negotiate with each to bring the new interventions forward as soon as possible. The company that expects to make the most from delay will, in theory, just pay the other company, or companies, to be the last one to release the intervention.
xxi If, however, things do not work out so well in practice, the rating might be amended to proportion credit differently. It is also possible to refrain from crediting companies that are charged with delaying the entry of their drugs onto the market (or withdrawing their drugs from the market) when this does not benefit the poor.
xxii If this issue can be resolved, the main challenge for estimating existing products' impact is to develop good proxies for burden, effectiveness, and access. A good proxy is one that both tracks the variable of interest and, if manipulated by companies, would yield good results for the poor. Moreover, it must be possible for companies to affect the proxy. One of the things that makes choosing good proxies difficult is that burden, effectiveness, and access are connected. Given that not everyone can access every drug, for instance, it is not clear how we can tell how effective the drug is for those who do secure it. Nevertheless, subsequent sections will consider just a few of the issues that arise in choosing good proxies for burden, effectiveness, and access independently.
Measuring Burden
One of the main constraints in determining the disease burden any particular intervention might alleviate (as well as access to that intervention and its effectiveness) is data at the global level. Data on disease burden for some diseases may not be available. Perhaps the best source for burden of disease information is the Institute for Health Metric and Evaluation's GBD study (now supported by the WHO and the Gates Foundation). Though, even this study lacks information on many diseases. Still, as discussed above, it may be acceptable to narrow the rating system's focus for pragmatic reasonsresearchers might consider only those diseases that have a large impact in developing countries (i.e. the poorest) that appear on the GBD list.
Suppose we limit our attention to deciding between the available measures of disease burden for which global health data is available through the GBD study. For, there is little global data using other measures of disease burden like Quality Adjusted Life Years (QUALYs) and the GBD study is one of the best and most comprehensive sources of global burden of disease information available. We must, then, decide whether to use (prevalence or incidence) DALYs or the years of life lost (YLL) to a disease. (The GBD study does not provide information on Quality Adjusted Life Years, for instance.) We must also decide between different ways of modifying DALYs available. The GBD study provides information about DALYs calculated with a 3% discount factor and/or age weights. Discounting gives less weight to the benefit of interventions' impacts in the future, while the age weighting in the GBD study gives more credit to interventions that benefit those in early adulthood as opposed to children or the elderly.
If we must choose between using DALYs or (different estimates of) YLL to a disease, an advantage of using DALYs is that they include some information about the burden of disability due to disease. Some diseases are terrible but do not kill their victims. If the disease burden was only measured in YLL, companies would receive no credit for curing or ameliorating these diseases.
Very roughly, DALYs are YLL to disease plus years lost to disability (YLD).
xxiii It is possible to lose a DALY to malaria or tuberculosis, for instance. The YLL is, roughly, a standard life expectation (for women and men) minus the age at death. xxiv The most common (incidence) measure of YLD is roughly disease duration times incidence and disability weight. The original disability weights in the GBD study were based on health care providers' judgments about how bad different disabilities are compared with one another and mortality rates at the population level. Experts were asked questions comparing different disease states to each other and life extension like: "If you had to choose between providing a medication that would extend the life of 1,000 healthy people by one year or 2,000 blind people by one year, which would you do?" xxv These judgments were made after discussion with other health care providers at an international conference with participation of providers from many different cultures. The experts were asked to give consistent preference rankings. xxvi The GBD study's justification for constructing DALYs in this way appealed to the axiom that the burden of disease for similar health outcomes should be identical -that is, that the only non-health factors that are relevant to the health outcome are age and sex. Though, the methodology continues to evolve.
There are some philosophical issues with the construction of DALYs that are worth noting.
xxvii The first is that it is not at all clear whose preferences are the most reliable guides to the actual burden of death and disability.
xxviii Those who are sick or disabled (henceforth, simply, disabled) often believe that their disabilities are not as bad as others believe them to be. They often have more knowledge about the relevant possibilities (phenomenological as well as factual) but, some argue, their opinions may be distorted by the fact that they have adapted to their poor condition.
xxix It really matters whose opinions are used in the current context (though different measures for the size of the burden of disease and what we should do about it may be necessary). If disabilities get less weight in DALY estimates then, on the proposed rating system, companies will get more credit for saving the lives of disabled people but less credit for alleviating their disability. This is because, in effect, disabled peoples' lives are discounted by the weight of their disability in the DALY calculations. Suppose for instance that, given that deaf people assign deafness a lower disability weight than non-deaf people, a company that helps a deaf person hear will avert 10 rather than 20 DALYS. Suppose another company saves the life of that deaf person but does not cure his or her deafness, and saving the life of an (otherwise similar) non-deaf person would be worth 30 DALYS. Once we consider the fact that some DALYS would still be lost to deafness, the second company will get 20 DALYS worth of credit for saving the deaf person's life if we use the deaf people's evaluation (30-10). The second company will only get 10 DALYS worth of credit for saving the deaf person's life on the non-deaf people's evaluation . Even if the preferences of the disabled should ultimately get priority, however, there are no alternative weights provided (e.g. by disabled people) with which we might try to arrive at a better estimate of DALYs lost to different diseases.
If DALYs are selected, however, it is possible to choose between two ways of calculating DALYs (incidence and prevalence measures), whether to discount them, and whether to use age-weighted DALYs. Consider each of these issues in turn.
In trying to measure the DALYs lost to a disease in a given year, incidence and prevalence DALYs deal in different ways with the burden of disabilities. Prevalence DALYs include the disability people are currently experiencing as a result of that disease say, those suffering from lung cancer in 2004 (whenever these people acquired the cancer). Incidence DALYs include a projection of the present and future disability attributable to lung cancer acquired in 2004.
xxx An example will help illustrate the difference.
xxxi Suppose that there are two forty year old men and we want to know the DALYs lost in 2004 and each of the next forty years in which they are expected to live. . Incidence DALYs consider the total impact of death and disability that happens in a given year. Prevalence DALYs consider the total impact of death in a given year but consider the disability experienced in that year (that may have been acquired much earlier).
The difference between using incidence and prevalence DALYs might not be important if we do not discount DALYs.
xxxiii With discounting, however, this difference is significant. They will not only yield different estimates of disease burden but will give different weight to some diseases over others. Though, in both cases the impact of interventions in the future on both measures will be less (that is just the effect of discounting.) Consider an example from Drew Schroeder's important paper "Prevalence, Incidence, and Hybrid Approaches to Calculating DALYs." Suppose there are two diseases. The first one afflicts 100 people a year and causes a serious disability with a disability weight of .5. The resulting disability lasts for one year. The second disease afflicts two people per year and also causes a serious disability with a disability weight of .5 but the resulting disability lasts for 50 years. Suppose that since the second disease has been around long enough, 100 people have it at any point in time. At any given time, both diseases cause 50 DALYs to be lost if we do not discount whether or not we use incidence or prevalence DALYs (.5*100). If we use discounted prevalence DALYs, both diseases will still be judged equally burdensome. If we use discounted incidence DALYs, however, the first disease will look almost twice as bad as the second (at standard discount rates). It is hard to see why the first disease should be counted as worse than the second in terms of the global disease burden (once the second has been around long enough). The second yields just as much disability in every year. So, if we discount DALYs, there is some reason to use a prevalence measure.
But, should we then discount? One rationale for discounting is to track individuals' preferences. People may prefer to give more weight to earlier rather than later health benefits. Alternately, it may be reasonable to discount at the population level to account for the possibility of human extinction. Though, the chance of extinction is nowhere near the standard 3% per year discount rate that is used in calculating DALYs. xxxiv Fortunately, we need not consider whether these arguments are sustainable, or other philosophical arguments for or against discounting the future, to conclude that there is some reason to discount. xxxv In the current context, uncertainty about what health interventions will be developed in the future provides reason to discount. Drug resistance and new drug development tend to make existing interventions obsolete. Any projected credit companies receive should be discounted for the chance that their interventions will alleviate less health burden into the future. This might, more precisely, be reason to discount estimates of drug effectiveness. However, discounting DALYs will achieve the same result. For, the proposed rating system is Burden*Effectiveness*Access and discounting enters into the equation multiplicatively. Although much more reflection on this topic is necessary, there is at least one reason to discount. xxxvi Finally, consider age weighting. In the GBD study, more weight is given to the disease burden for adults than for children or the elderly. This is because, in some studies, people give preference to years of life lived as a young adult (though, the evidence here is quite mixed).
xxxvii One objection to age weighting is that this treats some lives as more valuable than others.
xxxviii The fact that the authors assume that all individuals potentially live through every life stage does little to allay this worry. When YLD are calculated, for instance, the effects of disease on those who die young receive less weight. Moreover, insofar as the aim is to give companies an incentive to ameliorate disease in the future, this measure will encourage them to focus on helping young adults. If they do so, those who die young will not benefit as much as they would if companies focused equally on the needs of children. If we really should treat all people equally, perhaps we should not incentivize companies to address diseases that impact young adults, in particular? One possible response to this objection is that the population structure in developing countries is skewed towards younger populations, so if the age weighting better approximates the population structure in these countries, age-weighting may be appropriate as a way of achieving equal treatment across age groups.
xxxix Unfortunately, however, there is little reason to think that age weighting will get the population structure right (even for the average disease in the study) as there are usually many children in developing countries. If one is really committed to treating all people equally, it would make more sense to apply age weights that reflect the population age structure in each country using population life tables for these countries (e.g. to weight age groups by their proportion in each country's population).
xl One might object that the preceding argument required a commitment to rewarding companies for helping all people equally. If doing so does not give them an incentive to reduce the GBD as much as possible, perhaps that commitment is unsustainable in light of the purpose of the present study. xli Though the last section suggested rewarding companies based on how their medicines actually impact poor people's health, and illustrated how this might be done by considering the burden of disease each drug will alleviate in the relevant countries in DALYs, that is not the only possible measure of disease burden. We may not want to incentivize companies to just minimize the DALYs lost. Some ways of reducing this burden may be better than others because, for instance, they help all people equally. There may be reason to credit companies more for reducing the burden in the better way.
xlii Unless there is reason to believe that age weighted DALYs are more accurate than unweghted DALYs in measuring the burden of disease, however, there is no reason to think we must choose between using a more accurate measure of disease burden and giving companies an incentive to help all people equally. xliii Although much more consideration is warranted, philosophical reflection can help us select the best of the available measures of disease burden for constructing a good rating system.
xliv Such inquiry might suggest, for instance, using discounted prevalence DALYs (perhaps weighted by population life tables) in countries where the intervention being evaluated is a first-line therapy. At least, if the above arguments go through, there is some reason to accept this conclusion. So let us suppose that that is the measure ultimately selected and consider, next, how to measure effectiveness and access to get an estimate of companies' drugs' (marginal potential) impact on the GBD.
Measuring Effectiveness
Consider how to estimate drug effectiveness. The obvious proxy is efficacy in clinical trials. One problem with this proxy is that clinical trial data may not reflect real-world drug efficacy. People may be more likely to adhere to treatment regimes, they may receive additional medical care or other benefits and even the quality of the medicines may be different. Unfortunately, there is currently no easily accessible, comparable, global efficacy information outside of clinical trial results. So although there may be reason to try to get more accurate estimates in the future, clinical trial results may provide a good starting point.
Some meta-analyses of efficacy data are available for some diseases but it is possible to supplement these studies with additional country-level data. Consider, for instance, some of the efficacy data on some malaria drugs' impact. This is available from the WHO's Global Report on Antimalarial Drug Efficacy and Drug Resistance 2000-2010. It is also possible to find efficacy information from clinical trials conducted in many countries. Below is a graph with both the country/regional efficacy data and the WHO's Global Report on Antimalarial Drug Efficacy and Drug Resistance 2000-2010 data for Chloroquine. xlv Graph 1. WHO and Collected Data on Chloroquine Efficacy by Country/Region The next step is to develop the methodology for combining this data and estimating missing data. The global efficacy estimates used in the general explanation of how to design a rating system were simple averages of regional estimates, but it is better to calculate a closer approximation.
xlvi Drug effectiveness depends on many things related to different geographic locations (in some climates, for instance, the disease is more or less prevalent and stable and this effects transmission rates and affected individuals' parasite loads, which effects drug efficacy). xlvii Very roughly, one possible way of trying to combine the data is by categorizing each geographical area using estimates of transmission potential derived from vector ecology data (the ME index available from The Earth Institute at Columbia University) and other variables of relevance to drug efficacy for which it is possible to acquire global data.
xlviii This will provide the basis for developing a causal model (using regression analysis), in collaboration with experts in biostatistics, with which to impute efficacy estimates to different geographical regions using the collected efficacy data.
xlix Other relevant information includes the size and quality of the study, the year in which it was conducted, the treatment group, and what the drug at issue was compared with (if anything) in the study. Resulting efficacy estimates for all geographical regions will be combined to yield a global efficacy estimate. For the potential uses of the rating system described in the introduction, the results must be precise enough that, once drugs' impacts are aggregated, they issue a consistent ordinal ranking of companies. The disaggregated data might also be useful for guiding targeting interventions. 
Measuring Access
The obvious proxy for access is price, though price is certainly not the only barrier to access and there are different barriers in different circumstances. Affordability, availability, accessibility, accommodation, and acceptability all affect access.
lii So, one might think a good proxy should be disease or drug specific. In some cases, price may be the biggest barrier to access and so measuring price alone might be sufficient. In other cases, health infrastructure might be the biggest problem and it may be possible to reward companies for collaborating with partners in the developing world who have the ability to deliver their drugs to those in need. The problem with disease specific proxies is that they may not be comparable between cases. How does a price of $3.50 per Chloroquine pill compare with providing three thousand people measles vaccine for free through a drug donation program? Although it might, in principle, be possible to compare the impact of things like health infrastructure improvements and new public-private partnerships in terms of DALYs saved, doing so would be incredibly difficult. It may be hard even to measure the impact of some of the things companies are doing to improve access. It may be hard to tell, for instance, how much credit a company should get for giving drugs at a small cost to another company with the ability to distribute (and profit from) distributing their medicine to the poor. So, it might be better to limit the scope of the project by focusing only on certain barriers to access, at least initially.
Even if price is the selected proxy for access, it may take some work just to estimate global drug prices. Companies are reluctant to provide this information. In part this is because prices vary significantly in different contexts and companies do not want their customers and competitors to access this information. Fortunately, there are a couple of ways around this problem. It might be possible to work with non-governmental and governmental organizations focusing on health like the World Health Organization, Medicines San Frontiers, or health ministries to secure a broad range of pricing information. The global fund provides information on the prices for many medications as do many health ministries.
liii One nice thing about some country-level regulatory bodiese.g. in Columbia, Canada, and Brazil -is that they have done reference-based pricing. That means that their prices are set on the basis of other companies' prices. So, relying on their prices as a proxy provides some information about prices in countries in their region.
If decent price data is available it may be important to take into account how often the treatment must be administered over the course of the average (e.g. sick) individual's life. A drug that is given at birth and prevents all future infection may, in effect, cost less than one that has to be given yearly. Perhaps a reasonable estimate of access would be 1/(price per dose*c*# of times it must be given). The scaling term, c, may just be necessary to ensure that lower prices (less than a dollar per dose) continue to increase (rather than decrease) impact. Though, perhaps a scaling term should also modulate the impact of price in the rating system to capture its importance compared with disease burden and efficacy in reducing the GBD. liv If necessary, it is possible to work without information about access and focus on the question: How much good would companies' drugs do if everyone had them? This is still valuable information. It provides a measure of drug quality in light of disease burden. It would be a significant improvement over the status quo if companies focused on producing high quality drugs that could alleviate large burdens. There is even an argument that that is all companies are responsible for doing. Others, e.g. governments or non-governmental organizations, should help fill the breech and provide those drugs to people who need them. Although I believe that this argument is, ultimately, mistaken -it would be best if companies provided drugs that actually alleviate disease burden --potentially useful drugs are still important.
lv Others may help provide them to people in need and, eventually, after the drugs come off patent and technology progresses, they may benefit people (in future generations). lvi Note, however, that whether or not access is included, the design of a rating system poses difficult questions about relative concern for people in present and future generations. There may be a tradeoff between giving credit for widely available and more effective drugs. Alternately, given resistance rates and changes in disease prevalence and impact, we might have to decide how to specify rewards for drugs that we expect to alleviate larger burdens in the future than in the present. One way of starting to do so is to develop a model of expected present and future drug impact and then consider the realm of possible ethical decisions very carefully.
III. Conclusion
Ideally, a rating system for pharmaceutical companies' efforts to extend access on essential medicines will: 1) Improve the quality of existing essential medicines and 2) stimulate development of multiple new essential medicines. It may succeed in this objective by, for instance, giving companies an incentive to lower prices on, or streamline and invest in R&D on these medicines. This paper has outlined a rating system that might help achieve these objectives by addressing some of the technical and philosophical design issues necessary for rating companies' efforts to extend access on essential medicines to the poor. In doing so, it argued that practical work on promoting global health can yield interesting new philosophical questions and conclusions. For, what normative questions arise, and what answers are appropriate, depends significantly on what one is trying to achieve. Although decisions about some things should not be policy driven, others are more properly pragmatic. So, this inquiry suggests that there is a lot of room for further research on the proper relationship between normative and pragmatic considerations in designing a good rating system. xix Of course, if there were good empirical evidence that all available alternatives to purchasing child labor made goods would be worse for the children, it might be best to purchase the goods.
xx It may also be a necessary to consider the problems associated with medicines in estimating their net benefits (e.g. some drugs have pretty bad side effects that should probably be taken into account, others require difficult to implement treatment regimes). Finally, see preceding note. xxi In the US, combination therapies have to be tested and FDA approved together so companies have to cooperate in the process of creating them in any case. 
